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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Because this is an appeal from a final order entered in a formal adjudicative
proceeding by the Utah Labor Commission, the Utah Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) of the Utah Code. Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002).
ISSUES ON REVIEW
1.

Issue: Whether it was reversible error for the Labor Commission to fail to include

the results of Respondent Worker's Compensation Fund's ("WCF's") independent
medical examination performed by Dr. Daniel J. Hammond (which resulted in an opinion
favorable to Petitioner), in addition to a substantial number of other medical records and
reports, among the medical records and reports submitted to the medical panel?
Standard of Review with Supporting Authority: Correctness; No deference. Color
Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn., 2001 UT App 370 fll, aff'd sub nom Thomas v. Color
Country Mgt. 2004 UT 12.
Issue Preserved at: Record at 319 - 325, especially 323 - 324.
Determinative Law: U.S. Const., Amendment XIV §1 (due process); Utah Const.,
Article 1 §7 (due process); Color Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn, 2001 UT App 370128,
ajfd sub nom Thomas v. Color Country Mgt.. 2004 UT 12 (Labor Commn. proceedings
must satisfy basic notions of fairness); Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601 (2005); Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(a), (d), (e), (h) (2004) (bases for reversing administrative rulings);
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Utah Admin. Code 602-2-1 F.3. (2006) (authorizing IME), Utah Admin. Code 602-2-1 H
(2006) (respondent to prepare medical records exhibit containing all relevant medical
records); Utah Admin. Code 602-2-2 (2006) (medical panel to resolve conflict in prior
medical reports).
2,

Issue: Whether it was reversible error for the Utah Labor Commission's

Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") to appoint a medical panel to determine medical
causation with respect to Petitioner's injury when the only "conflicting medical report"
cited to create a "significant medical issue" for purposes of appointing the panel was an
unsigned internal medical records review purportedly generated by a WCF "physician
reviewer," who was later claimed to be WCF's Medical Director, one Dr. Roger Stewart?
Standard of Review with Supporting Authority: Whether there are conflicting
medical reports is a question of fact to be upheld if supported by substantial evidence
based on the record as a whole. See Brown & Root Indus. Svc. v. Industrial Commn of
Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997); Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) (2004).
Appellate review of Labor Commission's application of its own rules is whether Labor
Commission acted within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality (abuse of
discretion); but Labor Commission's discretion is limited by application of its own rules.
See Brown & Root at 677; Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) (2004).
Issue Preserved at: Not raised by pro se Petitioner. Plain error; Exceptional
Circumstances; Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.
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Determinative Law: U.S. Const., Amendment XIV §1 (due process); Utah Const.,
Article 1 §7 (due process); Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-802 (2005) (Labor Commission not
bound by technical rules of evidence); Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8(l)(b)(c) (2004)
(admissibility of evidence in formal adjudicative proceedings); Beehive Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Commn.. 2004 UT 18139, 89 P.3d 131 (hearsay residuum rale); Wilson v.
Industrial Commn.. 735 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (same); Color Country Mgt.
v. Labor Commn., 2001 UT App 370128, affd sub nom Thomas v. Color Country Mgt.,
2004 UT 12 (Labor Commn. proceedings must satisfy basic notions of fairness); Utah
Code Ann. §34A-2-601 (2005) (authorization to appoint medical panel); Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-16(4)(d), (h) (2004) (bases for reversing administrative decisions); Utah Admin.
Code 602-2-2 A (2006) (bases for appointing medical panel); Brown & Root Indus. Svc.
v. Industrial Commission, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997) (Commission's discretion to
appoint medical panel limited by commission's own administrative rules).
3,

Issue: Whether it was reversible error for the ALJ to delegate to the chairman of

the medical panel the authority to appoint such other "specialists you deem appropriate to
assist you in your evaluation" without supervising or reviewing the appointment of such
additional panel members.
Standard of Review with Supporting Authority: Correctness; no deference. Color
Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn.. 2001 UT App 370117, affd sub nom Thomas v. Color
Country Mgt.. 2004 UT 12.
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Issue Preserved at: Not raised by pro se Petitioner. Plain error; Exceptional
Circumstances; Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.
Determinative Law: U.S. Const., Amendment XIV §1 (due process); Utah Const.,
Article 1 §7 (due process); Color Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn., 2001 UT App 370128,
aff d sub nom Thomas v. Color Country Mgt.. 2004 UT 12 (Labor Commn. proceedings
must satisfy basic notions of fairness); Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(l)(a) (2005)
(appointment of medical panel); Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(a), (d), (e), (f), (h)
(2004) (bases for reversing administrative decision).
4.

Issue: Whether it was reversible error for the ALJ/medical panel chairman to

appoint members of the medical panel without providing prior notice to Petitioner of the
names of the proposed panel members, a description of the proposed panel members'
professional affiliations and an opportunity to object to their appointments?
Standard of Review with Supporting Authority: Correctness; No deference. Color
Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn., 2001 UT App 370 f 17, ajfd sub nom Thomas v. Color
Country Mgt.. 2004 UT 12.
Issue Preserved at: Record at 340.
Determinative Law: U.S. Const., Amendment XIV §1 (due process); Utah Const.,
Article 1 §7 (due process); Color Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn.. 2001 UT App 370 <P8,
ajfd sub nom Thomas v. Color Country Mgt.. 2004 UT 12 (Labor Commn. proceedings
must satisfy basic notions of fairness); Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(a), (d), (f), (h)
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(2004) (bases for reversing administrative decisions).
5.

Issue: Whether it was reversible error for the ALJ/medical panel chairman to

appoint to the medical panel, which consisted of only two doctors, a doctor:
a.

directly affiliated with one of Petitioner's prior medical providers, from
whom important medical records were obtained and reviewed by the
medical panel in its evaluation; and

b.

who has close business ties to Respondent Park City Family Healthcare
("PCFH"), Petitioner's former employer from whose employment she had
been terminated?

Standard of Review with Supporting Authority: Correctness; No deference. Color
Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn., 2001 UT App 370117, ajfd sub nom Thomas v. Color
Country Mgt.. 2004 UT 12.
Issue Preserved at: Record at 340.
Determinative Law: U.S. Const., Amendment XIV §1 (due process); Utah Const,
Article 1 §7 (due process); Color Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn., 2001 UT App 370128,
aff'd sub nom Thomas v. Color Country Mgt., 2004 UT 12. (Labor Commn. proceedings
must satisfy basic notions of fairness); Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(a), (d), (f), (h)
(2004) (bases for reversing administrative decisions).
6.

Issue: Whether the Utah Labor Commission committed reversible error when it

found a lack of medical causation between the industrial accident and the left ulnar nerve
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injury suffered by Petitioner.
Standard of Review with Supporting Authority: Substantial evidence when viewed
in light of the whole record. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) (2004); Acosta v. Labor
Commn. 2002 UT App 67129, 44 P.3d 819.
Issue Preserved at: Record at 319-325; 338-347; 357-361.
Determinative Law: U.S. Const., Amendment XIV §1 (due process); Utah Const.,
Article 1 §7 (due process); Utah Code Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) (2004); Acosta v. Labor
Commn. 2002 UT App 67129, 44 P.3d 819.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Utah Code Ann. S34A-2-601 (2005) (See Addendum)
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (2004) (See Addendum)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This petition for review is from the Order Denying Request
for Reconsideration issued by Respondent, Utah Labor Commission, denying that portion
of Petitioner's claim for benefits under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act dealing
with the on-the-job injury sustained by Petitioner to her left arm on February 19, 2003.
Course of Proceedings Below:

On February 19, 2003, Petitioner, injured her

left arm in a work-related accident while manipulating 110 lbs. of x-ray equipment. After
her claim for worker's compensation was denied by Respondent WCF, Petitioner applied
for a hearing before the Labor Commission. In the course of proceeding, the ALJ struck
Respondents' defenses of lack of medical causation and pre-existing condition for failure
to properly support them in their answer, and ruled in Petitioner's favor on all issues that
were then ripe. The Labor Commission Appeals Board later reversed and remanded the
ALJ's decision in favor of a full hearing on the merits.
In accordance with the Appeals Board's order, the ALJ ordered Respondents to
update and file a new medical records exhibit. The ALJ also ordered Petitioner to
undergo an independent medical examination. Respondents, however, did not file a new
medical records exhibit as ordered. The IME was performed and concluded that
Petitioner had sustained injuries to the nerves in her left elbow as a result of the industrial
accident. The IME report was filed with the Labor Commission.
Based on an unsigned internal WCF physician medical records review, attributed
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to one Dr. Stuart, the ALJ determined that a medical panel was need to resolve conflicting
medical opinions on the issue of medical causation. The ALJ appointed Alvin Wirthlin,
M.D. to the medical panel, referred the issue of medical causation to the panel and
instructed Dr. Wirthlin to appoint to the panel any other specialists who he deemed
appropriate to assist him. Without notice to Petitioner, Dr. Wirthlin selected Dr. Laird
Swenson of The Orthopedic Specialty Hospital - Park City ("TOSH-PC"). TOSH-PC had
already provided medical records in this proceeding relating to physical therapy Petitioner
received from TOSH-PC in 2001 for what appears to have been a relatively minor prior
injury to her left shoulder. TOSH-PC also relies heavily on Petitioner's former employer,
Respondent PCFH, for referrals. Petitioner did not discover Dr. Swensen's appointment
until she arrived to be interviewed by the medical panel. She did not learn of Dr.
Swensen's affiliation with TOSH-PC until after the medical panel rendered its opinion.
Although it had the IME report for three months before the medical panel
convened, the Labor Commission did not forward it, or other important medical records
in its possession, to the medical panel for its consideration. Purportedly based on the
records in its possession, and on its interview and cursory examination of Petitioner, the
medical panel concluded that there was a lack of medical causation between the 2003
industrial accident and the injury to the nerves in Petitioner's left elbow. Petitioner's
objections to the Medical Panel Report, based both on the composition of the medical
panel and its conclusions, were denied by the Labor Commission. Petitioner has
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exhausted her administrative remedies and appeals to the Court to reverse and remand the
Labor Commission's decision based on violations of due process, applicable statutes,
rules and case law.
Disposition Below: The Labor Commission denied workers compensation
benefits to Petitioner for the injuries to the nerves in her left elbow based on its finding of
a lack of medical causation between the 2003 industrial accident and Petitioner's injuries.
Statement of Facts:
1.

On February 19, 2003, Petitioner, who was then an x-ray technician employed by

Respondent Park City Family Healthcare ("PCFH"), suffered an injury at work when
pieces of an x-ray machine she was attempting to use came loose, striking her on the chest
and holding her against a wall. Record at 329.
2.

The combined weight of the machinery that fell on Petitioner was approximately

110 pounds. Id.
3.

In an attempt to prevent the machinery from falling further, Petitioner tried to

catch the machinery with her left arm and hand as it fell. Record at 312; 376 at pp. 31 Ins.
13-23, 108 Ins. 1-16, 113 In. 15 - 114 ln.8.
4.

Petitioner's attempt to catch the falling x-ray machinery with her left hand and arm

resulted in hyper-extension or "sudden resisted flexion" at the elbow. Record at 312.
5.

Following this incident, in addition to relatively milder issues with her back and

left shoulder, Petitioner experienced significant problems with cubital tunnel syndrome
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and the ulnar nerve in her left elbow. Record at 298 - 303; 330; 376 at pp.34 ln.7 - 41
ln.9.
6.

The problems with Petitioner's left elbow have required several surgeries in an

attempt to alleviate Petitioner's symptoms. Record at 299 - 300; 314, 330.
7.

These surgeries have proven to be moderately successful, but at the time relevant

to the findings of fact in this case Petitioner continued to experience pain in her left elbow
region, loss of strength in her left arm and hand and "intermittent tingling and loss of
feeling in the ulnar fingers on the left extending into the middle finger," which causes her
to tend to drop things. Record at 314.
8.

By letter dated May 6, 2003, Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah ("WCF")

denied, inter alia, coverage of the ulnar nerve problem in Petitioner's left elbow, citing
the opinion of its own unnamed "physician reviewer" that "delayed onset and distal
involvement" showed a lack of medical causation. Record at 008.
9.

On November 19, 2003, Petitioner, acting pro se, filed an Application for Hearing

with the Utah Labor Commission seeking, inter alia, coverage for the ulner nerve
problem in her left elbow. Record at 001 - 019.
10.

On December 5, 2003, Petitioner, acting pro se, filed an amended Application for

Hearing seeking coverage, inter alia, for that same issue. Record at 024 - 066.
11.

On January 5, 2004, WFC filed an answer on its own behalf and on behalf of its

insured, PCFH, generally denying the allegations in Petitioner's amended Application for
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Hearing primarily based on the defenses of lack of legal and medical causation. Record
at 069-070.
12.

The Labor Commission scheduled a formal hearing on Petitioner's claim for June

3, 2004 at 1:00 pm. Record at 073.
13.

By letter dated May 20, 2004, Petitioner, acting pro se, indicated that she had not

heard from WCF regarding the submission of medical exhibits and that accordingly she
was submitting her medical exhibits to her then employer, Respondent PCFH, for
arrangement and indexing in preparation for the hearing. Record at 099.
14.

On May 26, 2004, in preparation for the hearing and pursuant to Rule 602-2-1H.3,

Utah Administrative Code, Respondents submitted their medical records exhibit (J-l) to
the Labor Commission. Record at 102, 373.
15.

On May 28, 2004, Petitioner submitted her own medical records exhibit (J-2).

Record at 374.
16.

Petitioner's medical records exhibit contained some 20 pages of additional medical

records not contained in Respondents' medical exhibit. See Record at 374 pp. 1, 13, 16,
26, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 49, 50, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64.
17.

On June 3, 2004, Labor Commission Judge Richard M. LaJeunesse (the "ALJ")

held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's application. Record at 073; 097; 376.
18.

At the June 3, 2004 hearing, Petitioner pointed out to the ALJ that Respondents'

Exhbit J-l was lacking several of the records contained in Petitioner's Exhibit J-2,
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Respondents did not object to Exhibit J-2 and both J-1 and J-2 were received for review
by the ALJ. Record at 376 p.4 In. 18 - p.5 ln.l; 376 at p.28 In. 19 - p.30 ln.5.
19.

By an Order Nunc Pro Tunc, dated December 27, 2004, correcting certain clerical

errors to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated November 26, 2004,
the ALJ found and concluded, inter alia, that:
a.

On February 19, 2003, Petitioner was injured when 110 pounds of x-ray
equipment swung downward onto Ms. Pashuta's left arm;

b.

The February 19, 2003 industrial accident caused Petitioner "to sustain left
medial epicondylitis and ulnar neuropathy together with postoperative
subluxation of the left ulnar nerve at the elbow;"

c.

Petitioner was entitled to temporary total disability compensation because
of the accident;

d.

The issue of permanent partial disability compensation was not yet ripe for
decision because Petitioner had not yet received an impairment rating with
respect to her left arm injury resulting from the industrial accident; and

e.

Petitioner had no claim for permanent total disability because she had
returned to work. Record at 175 -179.

20.

Based on those findings and conclusions, the ALJ:
a.

Ordered Respondents to pay temporary total disability compensation, plus
accrued interest, to Petitioner;
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b.

Ordered Respondents to pay Petitioner's medical expenses reasonably
related to the February 19, 2003 industrial accident;

c.

Dismissed without prejudice, as unripe, Petitioner's claim for permanent
partial disability compensation; and

d.

Dismissed without prejudice Petitioner's claim for permanent total
disability compensation. Record at 179.

21.

On December 21, 2004, Respondents filed a Motion for Review to the Labor

Commission Appeals Board, challenging the ALJ's decision on the basis that his prior
decision to strike for lack of supporting evidence Respondents' defenses of lack of
medical causation and pre-existing condition, which resulted in the ALJ's refusal to admit
Respondents' Exhibits R-1 and R-2 at the July 3, 2004 hearing and in his ultimate ruling
in favor of Petitioner, was erroneous. Record at 157 -167.
22.

Respondent's Exhibits R-1 and R-2 appear nowhere in the Record.

23.

Respondent's Exhibit R-1 purports to be a signed copy of a WCF internal

physician's medical records review, supposedly signed by Dr. Roger Stuart, indicating a
lack of medical causation. Record at 376 p.5 ln.4 - p.12 ln.21.
24.

Respondent's Exhibit R-2 purports to be medical records relating to a 2001

industrial accident in which Petitioner suffered a shoulder injury. Id.
25.

The only thing in the Record that corresponds at all with the description of

Respondent's Exhibit R-1 is an unsigned confidential "Medical Director Review" done
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by an unidentified WCF internal "Physician Reviewer" and submitted on May 13, 2004 after the ALJ's April 30, 2004 Order on Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer. Record at
088 - 096.
26.

The only thing in the Record that corresponds with the description of Respondent's

Exhibit R-2 are a May 28, 2004 cover letter from Tiffanie Kilgore of TOSH-PC and
approximately 10 pages of physical therapy records for treatment provided by TOSH-PC
to Petitioner in 2001 for a shoulder strain, all of which was submitted on June 1, 2004 - a
few days after Respondents submitted their Exhibit J-l. Record at 102, 104 - 115, 373.
27.

On April 29, 2005, the Labor Commission Appeals Board issued its Order

Granting Motion for Review [and] Order of Remand wherein it set aside the ALJ's Order
Granting Motion to Strike and his subsequent Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order, and remanded the case for "such additional proceedings as are necessary to
establish a full record on the merits of [Petitioner's] claim and then issue a new decision
on the claim." Record at 192 - 195.
28.

On May 9, 2005, the ALJ entered an Order requiring Respondents to file a new

Medical Records Exhibit "containing all medical records pertaining to any medical issues
raised in this case" and including "all medical treatment notes or other relevant medical
records that came into existence since the last hearing on this matter." This Order also
granted Petitioner until August 19, 2005 to file any objections to Respondents' new
Medical Records Exhibit. Record at 198.
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29.

On May 19, 2005, Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration of the Appeal's

Board's reversal and remand of the ALJ's prior decision. Attached to that document were
numerous medical records, several of which had previously appeared only in Petitioner's
prior Exhibit J-2. Copies of all of these medical records were provided to Respondents.
Record at 200 - 252 (especially 237, 238, 247, 248, 251 & 252); 373; 374.
30.

On July 14, 2005, the ALJ issued an Order Compelling Discovery Compliance

wherein he granted Respondents' motion to compel Petitioner's attendance at an
independent medical examination (the "IME") to be conducted by Dr. J. Daniel
Hammond, an orthopedic surgeon. Record at 263; 268 - 269.
31.

Although Respondents requested an additional 30 days, until September 9, 2005,

to be able to include the results of the IME in their new medical records exhibit, Record at
263, the ALJ's Order Compelling Discovery Compliance did not address the requested
extension. Record at 268.
32.

The need for additional time to include the IME in the new medical records exhibit

was also pointed out in Petitioner's Response to Discovery Compliance that was filed on
August 2, 2005. Record at 271.
33.

Despite having received additional medical records from Petitioner that did not

appear in their prior medical records exhibit (Exhibit J-1), Respondents did not file a new
medical records exhibit by August 9, 2005 as required by the ALJ's May 9, 2005 Order.
34.

Dr. Hammond examined Petitioner on August 16, 2005. Record at 298.
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35-

On August 17, 2005, Petitioner filed her Petitioner's Submission of Medical

Exhibits wherein she enclosed 11 additional pages of medical records from her third and
fourth surgeries on her left elbow performed by Dr. Daniel Sellers, none of which were
included in either Respondents' prior Exhibit J-l or Petitioner's prior Exhibit J-2, and
further noted that:
a.

Dr. Hammond had conducted his IME on August 16, 2005;

b.

Dr. Hammond's IME report would be forthcoming in approximately 14
days;

c.

The time required to produce and submit the IME report would go beyond
the time provided in the ALJ's May 9, 2005 Order;

d.

Dr. Hammond indicated that his IME report would be consistent with Dr.
Seller's conclusions and favorable to Petitioner's position. Record at 272 284.

36.

On August 25, 2005, without waiting for Dr. Hammond's IME, the ALJ issued his

Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order wherein, inter alia, hef
a.

Identified that Respondent's Exhibits R-l and R-2 concerned their defenses
of lack of medical causation and pre-existing condition;

b.

Noted that Respondents had not submitted a new medical records exhibit;

c.

Closed the evidentiary record and deemed that matter ready for the present
Order;
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d.

Accepted into evidence Respondent's Exhibits R-l and R-2;

e.

Described Exhibit R-l as "constituting] an internal 'Medical Director
Review' completed by the insurance company's Physician Reviewer, Dr.
Roger Stuart" and reflecting his opinion that "Given the delayed onset and
distal involvement this clearly does not meet the standards for probable
medical causation . . . ; "

f.

Described Exhibit R-2 as "documents that indicated [Petitioner] suffered
some left shoulder and elbow problems in 2001 prior to the industrial
accident on February 19, 2003;"

g.

Found that the disagreement between the WCF records review opinion,
purportedly made by WFC's Dr. Stuart, and those of Petitioner's medical
treatment providers, Dr. Sellers and June Neely, CNP, concerning medical
causation required submission of the issue to a medical panel; and

h.

Reserved ruling on any compensation to Petitioner until after receiving a
report on medical causation from the medical panel. Record at 286 - 294.

37.

Also on August 25, 2005, the ALJ issued his proposed Medical Panel Referral

letter in blank. Record at 285, 296.
38.

On August 30, 2005, Dr. Hammond issued his IME report consisting of six single-

spaced pages. Based on his physical examination of Petitioner, an exhaustive review of
Petitioner's medical records and discussions with his x-ray technician (who had
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experience working with a machine similar to that involved in Petitioner's injury), Dr.
Hammond gave his medical opinion that 95% of Petitioner's cubital tunnel
syndrome/ulnar nerve injury was caused by the February 19, 2003 industrial accident, and
that only 5% of Petitioner's condition could be attributed to other causes. Record at 298 303 (generally); 302 (specifically).
39-

Dr. Hammond's IME report was filed with the Labor Commission by WCF as

"additional medical records" on September 9, 2005. Record at 297 - 303.
40.

Dr. Hammond's IME report was also filed with the Labor Commission on

September 20, 2005 as an attachment to Petitioner's Submission of Exhibits Ordered by
the Court and Response to Order ("Petitioner's Submission of Exhibits"). Record at 304.
41.

On September 28, 2005, the ALJ issued his Medical Panel Referral letter,

addressed to Alvin J. Wirthlin, M.D. and which:
a.

Appoints Dr. Wirthlin to "conduct an impartial evaluation of the medical
aspects of this case;"

b.

Authorizes Dr. Wirthlin to "select the specialists you deem appropriate to
assist you in your evaluation;"

c.

Generally describes the circumstances of the February 19, 2003 industrial
accident;

d.

Purports to enclose "all of the available medical records;"

e.

Includes a copy of the ALJ's August 25, 2005 Interim Findings of Fact,
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Conclusions of Law and Order; and
f.

Requests an answer "only to the following question: Please identify the left
upper extremity problems, if any, caused by [Petitioner's] industrial
accident on February 19, 2003."

42.

Without prior notice to Petitioner, Dr. Worthlin appointed Dr. Laird Swensen, an

orthopedic surgeon affiliated with TOSH-PC, to assist him as a member of the medical
panel. Record at 312, 340.
43.

TOSH-PC had provided physical therapy treatment to Petitioner in connection with

her 2001 shoulder sprain/bursitis condition. Record at 105 - 115, 340.
44.

The records created by TOSH-PC during this 2001 physical therapy were part of

the medical records submitted to the medical panel. Record at 314.
45.

There are contradictions in the medical records as to whether Petitioner's 2001

injury was to her right shoulder or her left shoulder. Most of PCFH's records initially
indicated that the injury was to Petitioner's left shoulder, but were corrected to indicate
the right shoulder, see Record at 373 pp. 100, 101 & 102, and most of TOSH-PC's
physical therapy records indicate that the injury was to Petitioner's left shoulder. See
Record at 106 -115; but see record of TOSH-PC's Kathleen Thomas, CNP's, referral to
physical therapy originally indicating injury to Petitioner's right shoulder which was
subsequently changed to left shoulder. Record at 115.
46.

Respondent PCFH is a significant source of patient referrals to TOSH-PC. Record
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at 340.
47,

Had Petitioner known that Dr. Swensen, or any other doctor affiliated with TOSH-

PC, was contemplated as a potential member of the medical panel, Petitioner would have
objected to that appointment. Id.
48*

The medical panel convened on January 11, 2006, interviewed but did not

extensively examine Petitioner, and filed its Medical Panel Report on February 16, 2006.
Record at 312-317.
49.

At the time she was interviewed by the medical panel, Petitioner had no memory of

any left elbow involvement in the 2001 injury. Record at 315.
50.

In its report the medical panel concluded that "it is not reasonably probable that the

left ulnar nerve problems were the result of the industrial accident on February 19, 2003."
Record at 316.
51.

The Record does not contain a compendium of the medical records that were

actually provided to the medical panel in connection with their review; and it is far from
clear what records were actually before the medical panel.
52.

From the Medical Panel Report's reference to receiving indexed medical records

from 11 medical providers comprising nearly 400 pages (an accurate description of
Respondents' initial medical records exhibit containing tabs from 11 providers and 384
marked pages), it appears clear that Exhibit J-l was provided to the medical panel.
Record at 312, 373.
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53.

From the lack of the specific result numbers from EMG/NCV tests administered

by Dr. Skuster, it seems clear that Petitioner's initial medical records exhibit (Exhibit J-2)
was not provided to the medical panel. Record at 313; 374 at p.33.
54.

Although a fairly specific reference is made to the third surgery performed by Dr.

Sellers on Petitioner's elbow in January 2005, the medical panel specifically stated that it
had no records of the fourth such surgery performed in August 2005. Record at 314. This
calls into question how many of the additional medical records submitted by Petitioner on
August 17, 2005 were actually given to the medical panel. See Record at 272 - 284 (Dr.
Seller's records regarding Petitioner's 3rd and 4th surgeries performed 1/5/05 and 8/10/05).
55.

While no mention is made in the Medical Panel Report of any opinion signed by

Dr. Roger Stuart that would comprise Respondents' Exhibit R-l, an allusion is made to a
WCF internal "medical record review" suggesting a lack of medical causation that was
documented in the "Findings of Fact." Record at 314.
56.

However, from the specific references to dates and notes contained in the 2001

TOSH-PC records, it seems clear that those records were provided to the medical panel.
Record at 105-115, 313.
57.

Conspicuously absent from the Medical Panel Report is any reference to Dr.

Hammond's IME report, which reached a completely opposite conclusion from that of the
medical panel. Record at 298 - 303; 312 - 317.
58.

On March 3, 2006, Petitioner filed Petitioner's Objection to Medical Panel Report,
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specifically arguing, inter alia, that the Medical Panel Report seemed to completely
ignore the conclusions of Dr. Hammond's IME report. Record at 319 - 325 (generally)
and 323 - 324 (specifically).
59.

On March 6, 2006, the ALJ issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Order (the "ALJ's Order") in which he adopted the opinion of the medical panel and held
that Petitioner's left ulnar nerve injury was not the result of the February 19, 2003
accident. Record at 326 - 337.
60.

Significantly, the ALJ's Order also contains no reference to Dr. Hammond's IME

report. Record at 326 - 336.
61.

On April 4, 2006, Petitioner filed her Motion for Review again arguing, inter alia,

Dr. Hammond's IME and asserting a conflict of interest/potential bias by medical panel
member Dr. Swensen. Record at 328 - 347.
62.

On April 27, 2006, Labor Commissioner R. Lee Ellertson issued his Order

Denying Motion for Review. Record at 353 - 356.
63.

In denying Petitioner's Motion for Review and upholding the ALJ's Order, the

Labor Commissioner found that there were no problems with the appointment of the
medical panel in general, or with the appointment of Dr. Swensen in particular, and
specifically, but inaccurately, observed that "the panel had the important advantage of
access to all Ms. Pashuta's medical records and the opinions of the other health care
professionals who treated or examined her." Record at 354.
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64.

On May 15, 2006, Petitioner filed an "Appeal from Commissioner Ellertson's

Order of April 27, 2006" to which she attached additional opinion evidence from Dr.
Sellers, her treating surgeon, about the causal relationship of the February 19, 2003
accident to Petitioner's ulnar nerve injury. Record at 357 - 361.
65.

The Labor Commissioner treated Petitioner's "appeal" as a request for

reconsideration, which he denied in his June 29, 2006 Order Denying Request for
Reconsideration on the basis that he continued to find the medical panel's opinion
persuasive. Record at 367 - 368.
66.

The Order Denying Request for Reconsideration reflected the fact that Petitioner

had exhausted her administrative remedies by stating that "Any party may appeal this
Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review with that Court within
30 days of the date of this Order." Record at 368.
67.

On July 28, 2006, Petitioner filed her Petition for Review with the Utah Court of

Appeals. Record at 371 - 372.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The decision of the Utah Labor Commission, from which this appeal is taken,
involved substantial breaches of Petitioner's right to due process, violated controlling
statutes and contravened controlling case law and applicable administrative rules.
The Labor Commission committed reversible error when it failed to provide all
relevant medical records, including but not limited to the report of the IME performed by
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Dr. Hammond, to the medical panel that it had appointed to determine whether the
February 19, 2003 industrial accident caused the injuries for which Petitioner was being
treated. The Labor Commission also committed reversible error in connection with the
appointment and retention of the medical panel by (1) allowing an unsigned WCF internal
physician's medical records review report to be used to create a medical controversy
requiring the appointment of a medical panel; (2) allowing the ALJ to delegate
appointment of members of the panel to the physician panel chair; (3) failing to provide
notice of the identities and affiliations of the proposed panel members, and an opportunity
to object, to Petitioner prior to appointing the members to the panel; and (4) failing to
remove Dr. Swensen from the medical panel and reversing and remanding the ALJ's
decision once Petitioner raised the issue of Dr. Swensen's potential partiality and bias.
Finally, the Labor Commission committed reversible error by adopting the finding of a
lack of medical causation by the medical panel when that finding was not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the record as a whole.
Because of these errors, Petitioner has been substantially prejudiced in that, but for
the medical panel's finding of a lack of medical causation, the Labor Commission's
decision almost certainly would have been much more favorable to Petitioner. For all of
the above reasons the Court should reverse the decision of the Labor Commission and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the requirements of due process
and applicable law.
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ARGUMENTS
Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Code (part of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act) governs appeals from decisions of the Utah Labor Commission. See, e ^ , Acosta v.
Labor Commn., 2002 UT App 67129; Color Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn., 2001 UT
App 370 fl6, ajfd sub nom Thomas v. Color Country Mgt., 2004 UT 12. Section 6346b-16 provides in relevant part:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by the following:
(a) the agency action . . . is unconstitutional...;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(c) the agency . . . has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact. .. that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice . . . ; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4) (2004)
I.

The Labor Commission Committed Reversible Error When it Failed to Include the
Results of Dr. Hammond's IME Report (Which Was Favorable to Petitioner), and
Many Other Medical Records and Reports, Among the Medical Records and
Reports Submitted for Review by the Medical Panel.
As part of the discovery process during the Labor Commission proceedings,

Respondents requested, and the ALJ ordered, Petitioner to submit to an IME by Dr.
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Daniel J. Hammond, an orthopedic surgeon. The IME was scheduled for August 16,
2005, which did not allow enough time for the IME report to be included in the jiew
medical records exhibit that the ALJ had ordered Respondents to produce by August 9,
2005 and allowed Petitioner until August 19, 2005 to object to. Both Respondents and
Petitioner pointed this fact out to the ALJ on the record. Respondents made a specific
request for additional time to include the IME, and Petitioner noted that the IME report
would be shortly forthcoming and favorable to her position when she submitted her
supplemental medical records on August 17, 2005. It is also important to note that
Respondents did not submit a new medical records exhibit as they had been ordered to do,
the fact of which the ALJ specifically referenced in his August 25, 2005 order.
Notwithstanding all of this, as part of his August 25, 2005 interim order the ALJ closed
the record.
On August 30, 2005, Dr. Hammond's IME report was completed. In it, Dr.
Hammond attributed 95% of Petitioner's left elbow ulnar nerve injury to the February 19,
2003 industrial accident at issue in this case. It was submitted to the Labor Commission
by Respondents on September 9, 2005 and by Petitioner on September 20, 2005. On
September 28, 2005, the ALJ issued a letter appointing a medical panel and purporting to
provide to it "all of the available medical records . . . " The medical panel did not convene
until January 11, 2006. Despite having the IME in the record since at least September 9,
2005 the Labor Commission did not forward it to the medical panel for its consideration.
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The Labor Commission can't simply ignore evidence that is presented to it. C£. Martinez
v. Media-Pavmaster Plus, 2005 UT App 308 H12 5 13, 15 & 16, 17 P.3d 1074, cert
granted 2005 Utah 223 (Commission can't ignore expert testimony that a claimant's
ability to work would require significant accommodations when determining whether
work is reasonably available to claimant).
That the medical panel did not receive a copy of Dr. Hammond's IME is made
clear by the fact that, despite Dr. Hammond having come to almost exactly the opposite
conclusion to that of the medical panel (which found a complete lack of medical
causation between the industrial accident and Petitioner's left elbow ulnar nerve injury),
no mention whatever of Dr. Hammond's IME is made in the Medical Panel Report.
Likewise, as is set out more fully in the Statement of Facts above, many other medical
records that had been submitted to the Labor Commission by both Petitioner and
Respondents clearly appear not to have been submitted to the medical panel.
The Due Process Clauses of U.S. and Utah Constitutions apply to proceedings
before the Utah Labor Commission. See, e,g., Color Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn.,
2001 UT App 370 f28, affd sub nom Thomas v. Color Country Mgt.. 2004 UT 12 (Labor
Commn. proceedings must satisfy basic notions of fairness); see also Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-16(4)(a) & (h) (2004). Failing to submit to the medical panel existing medical
records, especially an important medical opinion like Dr. Hammond's IME, is arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of agency discretion and cannot be said to satisfy basic notions
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of fairness. Moreover, the Labor Commission's failure to ensure that all the medical
records were provided to the medical panel does not comply with Labor Commission's
own rules. Rule 602-2-1H.3 of the Utah Administrative Code requires respondents to
prepare a joint medical records exhibit "containing all relevant medical records." One
obvious reason for this is so that a medical panel can reference them when asked to
resolve conflicting prior medical opinions and reports pursuant to Rule 602-2-2 of the
Utah Administrative Code.
The lack of basic fairness of this failure by the Labor Commission is especially
underscored by the Labor Commission Appellate Panel's earlier decision to reverse what
was in essence a partial directed verdict in favor of Petitioner on the issue of causation,
ordered by the ALJ due to Respondents' earlier procedural failings, because of the Labor
Commission's stated policy that "cases should be decided on their merits." It is difficult
to see how Petitioner's case could be decided on its merits when important medical
records, including Dr. Hammond's IME report, were not even provided for consideration
by the medical panel, whose opinion was later adopted by the ALJ and the Commission.
The failure of the Labor Commission to submit so many of the medical records in
this case, especially Dr. Hammond's IME, to the medical panel resulted in substantial
prejudice to Petitioner for purposes of Section 63-46b-16(4). Utah Code Ann. §63-46b16(4) (2004). Dr. Hammond's IME was based on an extensive physical examination of
Petitioner and a thorough review of the prior medical records. By contrast, the Medical
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Panel Report was based on only an interview and cursory examination of Petitioner, see
Record at 315, and a review of less than all of the then available medical records. See
Statement of Facts above.
Importantly, Dr. Hammond concluded based on the medical records that, although
Petitioner had suffered some left cubital tunnel symptoms in connection with the 2001
injury, those prior symptoms had resolved before the 2003 injury. Record at 301. For
that proposition, Dr. Hammond cited examinations of Petitioner by June Neely, CNP,
conducted after the 2001 injury and before the 2003 injury in which no further symptoms
were exhibited. Record at 301 - 302; see also. Record at 373, pp.84, 96 (notations of
"extremities: [normal]; neuro: intact"). It is reasonable to assume that the medical panel
would have paid close attention to the opinion of a specialist of the caliber of Dr.
Hammond had it been provided to them, and that the medical panel's conclusion
regarding medical causation might well have been different had it considered the IME
report and the other important medical records that it did not receive from the Labor
Commission. Had the Medical Panel Report reached a different conclusion regarding
medical causation, it is highly likely that the ALJ also would have reached a different
conclusion on that issue.
II.

The Labor Commission Committed Reversible Error When It Allowed the ALPs
Appointment of a Medical Panel to Resolve Conflicting Medical Opinions
Regarding Causation When there Was No Competent Evidence In the Record that
Supported a Dispute of Medical Causation.
In his Interim Order dated August 25, 2005, the ALJ found that there
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disagreements between the medical opinions of Petitioner's treating physicians, Dr.
Daniel Sellers and June Neely, CFP, and WCF's internal medical records reviewer, Dr.
Stuart, regarding whether medical causation existed between the February 19, 2003
industrial accident and Petitioner's current left upper extremity problems. Record at 290,
292. Therefore, the ALJ found that a medical panel had to be appointed to resolve the
issue of medical causation, and so ordered. Id- There are at least two problems with this
finding and order by the ALJ.
First, as discussed in more detail in the Statement of Facts above, no such medical
opinion by Dr. Stuart appears in the Record. The only thing that appears in the Record is
an unsigned "confidential" WCF "Medical Director Review" purportedly performed by
an unnamed "Physician Reviewer." See Record at 096. Without a signature identifying
an actual doctor who authored it, this document cannot be assumed to be a physician's
opinion. See also. Record at 376 p. 12 lns.2-17 (it is contrary to agency practice to allow
introduction of anonymous physician review).
Second, traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice mitigate against
insurers, such as WCF, manufacturing internal medical records review opinions in order
to force the appointment of medical panels in workers' compensation cases. Clearly, it is
in WCF's financial interest to avoid, or at least delay, paying as many claims as is
reasonably possible. What better way to accomplish this than to use a medical records
review opinion from its own employee doctor(s) to contradict the opinion of the injured
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party's treating physician(s) and force the issue to a medical panel? If a contradicting
medical opinion is to be given any weight at all, it should at least result from an
"independent medical examination" from a doctor who has actually examined the patient
and is not so beholden to WCF as one of its own employees would be. Cf. Brown & Root
Indus. Svc. v. Industrial Commn.. 947 P.2d 671, 673 - 674 & 677 - 678 (Utah 1997)
(considering only opinions of examining physicians, including an "independent medical
examination" requested by the insurance company, in affirming the Commission's
determination that there were no conflicting medical reports on the issue of causation that
would require appointment of a medical panel).
The appointment of a medical panel in this case resulted in substantial prejudice to
Petitioner. Because all of Petitioner's examining and treating physicians believed
medical causation to exist, without the medical panel's opinion to the contrary, Petitioner
undoubtedly would have prevailed on this issue before the Labor Commission and would
have been awarded compensation for her injuries.
Whether there are conflicting medical reports is a question of fact to be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. See Brown & Root
Indus. Svc. v. Industrial Commn of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997); Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) (2004). Appellate review of Labor Commission's application of
its own rules is whether Labor Commission acted within the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality (abuse of discretion); but Labor Commission's discretion is also limited by
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application of its own rules, see Brown & Root at 677; Utah Code Ann. §63-46b16(4)(h)(ii) (2004), in addition to the requirements of due process. See, e ^ , Color
Country Mgt. v. Labor Commn.. 2001 UT App 370128, affd sub nom Thomas v. Color
Country Mgt. 2004 UT 12 (Labor Commn. proceedings must satisfy basic notions of
fairness); see also Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(a) & (h) (2004).
Although this issue was not raised by Petitioner below, the Court should
nonetheless consider it based on the plain error, exceptional circumstances and/or
ineffective assistance of trial counsel exceptions to the preservation rule. See, e ^ , State
vjson, 2006 UT 26139, 135 P.3d 864; State v. King. 2006 UT 3 1113, 21; 131 P.3d 202.
To prevail upon a claim of plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: that
an error occurred; that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and that the
error was harmful. King at 121.
In the present case, plain error existed because the ALJ should not have admitted
into evidence a purported medical records review claimed to have been the product of a
Dr. Roger Stuart, one of WCF's employees, which was not even signed by Dr. Stuart.
Although the Labor Commission is not bound by the technical rules of evidence, see, e.g.,
Utah Code Ann. §§34A-2-802 (2005) & 63-46b-8(l)(b)(c) (2004), it still cannot base its
findings solely on hearsay. Due process requires some residuum of competent evidence
upon which a finding may be based. See, e^g., Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Commn., 2004 UT 18139, 89 P.3d 131 (hearsay residuum rule); Wilson v. Industrial
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Commn.. 735 P.2d 403,404 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (same).
The unsigned purported medical records review opinion of Dr. Stuart is the worst
kind of hearsay. It does not even bear enough indicia of authenticity to actually attribute
it to Dr. Stuart. The only evidence that it originated with Dr. Stuart was the proffer of
counsel for Respondents. Even if it were signed by Dr. Stuart, it would still be hearsay.
Consequently, there is no residuum of admissible evidence from which the ALJ could
have concluded that a conflict of medical opinions existed requiring referral to a medical
panel. Thus, the ALJ's finding of a conflict of medical reports regarding medical
causation of Petitioner's injuries was not properly supported and constituted an error, this
error should have been obvious to the ALJ and the appointment of the medical panel (that
resulted in an adverse finding for Petitioner which was followed by the Labor
Commission) was clearly harmful to Petitioner.
This issue should also be preserved by a combination of the exceptional
circumstances and ineffective assistance of counsel exceptions. While the exceptional
circumstances exception is ill-defined, it applies primarily to procedural abnormalities.
See State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74112, 10 P.3d 346. In the present case, exceptional
circumstances are created by the procedural abnormalities of the Labor Commission's
own rules that make it difficult for worker's compensation claimants to obtain
representation by competent counsel and forcing them to proceed pro se if at all.
Section 34A-1-309(1) of the Utah Code authorizes the Labor Commission to
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regulate and fix attorney fees in all cases coming before it. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1309(1) (2005). Labor Commission Rule 602-2-4 C. 3. a. essentially limits attorney
compensation to a contingency fee basis, and then limits that contingent fee for
proceedings before the Labor Commission to 20% or less of a claimant's weekly benefits
generated, not to exceed a total of $10,850.00. See Utah Admin. Code 602-2-4 C. 3. a.
(2006); see also, Stokes v. Flanders, 970 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1998) (generally upholding the
Labor Commission's ability to regulate fees in cases before it).
While the Labor Commission's regulation of attorney fees may have the laudable
objective of preserving a greater portion of a worker's compensation claimant's award for
the claimant, its practical effect is to limit a claimants ability to retain an attorney to
represent the claimant before the Labor Commission. Many attorneys are not willing to
work on a contingency fee basis, and the contingency rate set by the Labor Commission is
significantly lower than the standard 1/3 of the recovery arrangement that is typical in
contingency fee agreements. Consequently, when a worker's compensation claimant has
a difficult case he/she may very well find him/herself represented pro se, if indeed not so
discouraged as not even file an application for hearing with the Labor Commission. It
also goes without saying that pro se litigants are typically not trained in the law and,
therefore, are not very effective at enforcing their rights or preserving issues for appeal.
As a consequence, the Labor Commission's own rules limiting attorney fees creates an
inherent situation of ineffective assistance of counsel which gives rise to the exceptional
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circumstances exception which, in turn, preserves issues for appeal when they are not
properly preserved by pro se claimants.
In the present case, Petitioner found herself represented pro se. She is not trained
in the law and was unaware of her right to object, and therefore did not object, to WCFs
introduction of the hearsay internal medical records review opinion attributed to it's own
Dr. Roger Stuart, or to the ALJ's finding of need for a medical panel based on that
hearsay opinion without any residuum of competent evidence. Petitioner's failures to
object before the Labor Commission should not be held against her and preclude her from
raising issues before the Court.
III.

The Labor Commission Committed Reversible Error when, through the ALL It
Delegated the Appointment of Members of the Medical Panel to the Medical Panel
Chairman, Dr. Wirthlin, Who Is Not An Administrative Law Judge.
Section 34A-2-601(l)(a) of the Utah Code authorizes the Labor Commission's

Division of Adjudication to refer the medical aspects of a case "to a medical panel
appointed by an administrative law judge." Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(l)(a) (2005)
{emphasis added). It is axiomatic that due process requires that a medical panel which is
analogous to a court-appointed special master, should be impartial. Clearly, one of the
most important reasons for having the medical panel appointed by an administrative law
judge is to ensure that the members of the panel are impartial. Cf. Utah Code Ann. §34A2-601 (l)(c) (2005) (the division may employ a medical director as "an alternative method
of obtainiijg an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted
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case" to utilizing a medical panel) (emphasis added).
In the present case, the ALJ appointed Dr. Alvin J. Wirthlin to be the chairman of
the medical panel "to conduct an impartial evaluation of the medical aspects of this case,"
but then simply delegated to Dr. Wirthin the authority to select whatever "specialists you
deem appropriate to assist you in your evaluation" to be additional panel members, and
did not review the appointment of additional panel members by Dr. Wirthlin. Record at
310. This action by the ALJ, which was not reversed by the Labor Commission,
constituted an abdication of the ALJ's responsibility to ensure the impartiality of the
medical panel by the ALJ, himself, appointing its members.
This error by the ALJ, which was not reversed by the Labor Commission, resulted
in substantial prejudice Petitioner in that Dr. Wirthlin appointed Dr. Laird Swensen of
TOSH-PC to the medical panel. As discussed more fully below, it is reasonable to
assume that Dr. Swensen was more biased toward the 2001 TOSH-PC physical therapy
records, which tended to suggest a pre-existing left ulnar neuropathy, than the subsequent
PCFH records generated by June Neely, CNP, which, as noted in Dr. Hammond's IME,
tended to show that whatever prior symptoms Petitioner had were resolved prior to the
2003 industrial accident at issue in this case. In addition, given TOSH-PC s important
referral relationship with PCFH, it is not unreasonable to believe that Dr. Swensen would
be inclined to side with PCFH, and against Petitioner, in this case. Without Dr.
Swensen's inclusion on the medical panel, the medical panel's conclusion on medical
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causation, and therefore the ALJ's and the Labor Commission's conclusions on that issue,
might very well have been more favorable to Petitioner.
Again, like the issue of whether a medical panel should have been appointed at all,
the issue of the improper delegation of the appointment of the members of the medical
panel from the ALJ to the chairman of the medical panel, was not specifically preserved
for appeal by Petitioner. Nevertheless, for the same reasons as stated above, this issue
should be preserved under the plain error and/or exceptional circumstances/ineffective
assistance of counsel exceptions to the preservation rule.
IV.

The Labor Commission Committed Reversible Error By Failing to Give
PriorNotice and an Opportunity to Object to the Appointment of Dr. Swensen to
the Medical Panel.
The appointment of a medical panel by the Labor Commission is analogous to the

appointment of a special master by a court under Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 53. Rule 53(f) provides that "a party may object to the
appointment of any person as a master on the same grounds as a party may challenge for
cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action." Utah R. Civ. P., 53(f).
Rule 47 (f) provides the bases for challenging a juror in a civil action, which include "a
want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a person competent as a
juror." Rule 47(f)(1), Utah .R. Civ. P. Utmost among the qualifications required to make
a person a-competent juror is impartiality. See, e.g., Anderton v. Motgomery, 607 P.2d
828, 835 (Utah 1980) (due process requires that a jury be impartial and unbiased); State v.
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Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1348 (1977) (due process requires "that an accused receive a trial
before a fair and impartial jury free from outside influences"), reh'g denied 576 P.2d 857,
cert denied 439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219, 58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978).
Just as the interest in ensuring an impartial jury requires a voir dire process in a
civil action, due process must require that the appointment of a medical panel by the
Labor Commission also include adequate prior notice to a claimant of the individuals the
Labor Commission intends to appoint to the medical panel, including the names and
specialties of the proposed panel members, together with a description of their
professional affiliations, and an meaningful opportunity to object to the appointments of
such members.
As Petitioner specifically stated while objecting to Dr. Swensen's inclusion on the
two-member medical panel, had she been apprised of the situation beforehand, Petitioner
would have objected to the inclusion on the medical panel of any doctor affiliated with
TOSH-PC. Record at 340. As discussed above, substantial prejudice has resulted to
Petitioner by Dr. Swensen's appointment to the medical panel in that, absent Dr.
Swensen's appointment it is reasonable to believe that the medical panel, and therefore
the ALJ and the Labor Commission, would have reached a different conclusion regarding
the medical causation of Petitioner's left ulnar neuropathy.
V.

The Labor Commission Committed Reversible Error by Not Removing Dr.
Swensen from the Medical Panel and Reversing and Remanding the ALJ's
Decision Once Petitioner Raised the Issues of Dr. Swensen's Potential Partiality
and Bias.
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As noted above, the appointment of a member of a medical panel in a worker's
compensation proceeding is analogous to the appointment of a special master in a judicial
proceeding. In the present case, Petitioner objected to Dr. Swensen's appointment to the
two-member medical panel as soon as she learned of his affiliation with TOSH-PC.
Record at 340. Petitioner's objection was based on the issue of his potential partiality or
bias, which arose from two sources: (a) the strong referral relationship between
Respondent PCFH and TOSH-PC (indicating a financial incentive for Dr. Swensen to
find in favor of PCFH), and (b) the reasonable assumption that Dr. Swensen would favor
the medical records generated within his own practice over those generated elsewhere.
Due process requires that once a question of juror partiality or prejudice arises, "an
abuse of discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless
the court [] investigates further and finds the inference rebutted." State v. Wach, 2001
UT 35127, 24 P.3d 948, citing State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988). "It is not
enough if a juror believes that he or she can be impartial and fair . . . the court, not the
juror, must determine a juror's qualification." Id- at <fl33, citations omitted.
Moreover, because their positions are so analogous, medical panel members, like
special masters, should be bound by the ethics applicable to judicial officers. See Plumb
v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 742-743 (Utah 1990) (special masters required to conform to
ethics applicable to judicial officers). In this regard, Canon 2, Utah Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that "[a] judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
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impropriety in all activities;" and Canon 3.E.(1), Utah Code of Judicial Conduct provides
in relevant part that:
A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances
where:
(a) the judge has . . . personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;...
(c) the judge knows that the judge . . . has an economic interest in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or has more
that a de minimus interest that could be substantially affected by the
proceeding."
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3.E.(1).
Canon 4.D.(1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct also provides that "[a] judge shall
not engage in financial and business dealings t h a t . . . involve the judge in frequent
transactions or business relationships with those [who are] likely to come before the court
on which the judge serves."
Once Petitioner raised the issue of Dr. Swensen's potential bias, the Labor
Commission should have either removed Dr. Swensen or further investigated and
resolved the question of bias. It did neither. Instead, the Labor Commission simply
overruled Petitioner's objection stating that "[Petitioner] has failed to explain how Dr.
Swensen's ordinary professional relationship with TOSH[-PC] had any actual effect on
his impartiality or performance as a member of the medical panel..." Record at 354.
Contrary to the Commission's assertions, Petitioner very clearly indicated how Dr.
Swensen's relationship with TOSH-PC raised the specter of bias and impartiality. Once
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that specter was raised, it was improper for the Commission to lay the burden of proving
actual prejudice upon Petitioner. At that point it was incumbent upon the Commission to
either disqualify Dr. Swensen or perform its own investigation to ensure that there was no
actual bias. The Commission did neither, and by failing so to do committed reversible
error.
VI.

The Labor Commission Committed Reversible Error When It Relied Upon the
Finding of the Medical Panel that there Was No Medical Causation Between the
Industrial Accident and the Left Ulnar Nerve Injury Suffered by Petitioner.
The Labor Commission's denial of Petitioner's claims relating to her left ulnar

nerve was based on a determination of fact "that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record

" Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g)

(2004); Acosta v. Labor Commn. 2002 UT App 67 129, 44 P.3d 819 ("substantial
evidence" is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion) (citations omitted). Specifically, the finding of
the medical panel that there was no medical causation between the February 19, 2003
industrial accident, which was adopted in full by the ALJ and affirmed by the Labor
Commission, was not sufficiently supported by the evidence. A party seeking to overturn
the Commission's factual findings must first marshal all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Whitear v.
Labor Commn.. 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

41

The issue of medical causation between the February 19, 2003 industrial accident
and Petitioner's injuries was referred to the medical panel by the ALJ. Record at 311.
The medical panel found that Petitioner suffered only a thoracic strain as a result of the
industrial accident, and that it was "not reasonably probable that [Petitioner's] left ulnar
nerve problems were the result of the industrial accident on February 19, 2003." Record
at 316.
While the medical panel recites that it reviewed medical records from 11 medical
providers comprising nearly 400 pages, and that it interviewed and performed a cursory
examination of Petitioner, the evidence upon which it bases its opinion is actually very
scarce.1 First, the medical panel points to an internal WCF medical record review,
mentioned in the ALJ's Interim Findings of Fact but which was not actually before the
medical panel, suggesting medical causation had not been met. Record at 314. Next, the
medical panel points to the 2001 TOSH-PC physical therapy records that indicate pain
located in the left shoulder and elbow, with pain down the backside of the upper arm to
the elbow and a pins and needles sensation from the left side of Petitioner's neck to her
fingers. Id. referencing Record at 109. Then, the medical panel references that June
Neeley, CNP, Petitioner's primary care provider, reported left ulnar symptoms four weeks
after the incident, see id- referencing Record at 373 p. 15, and that Petitioner herself

1

Moreover, as demonstrated above, the medical panel did not have all of the
evidence before it when it reached its conclusions.
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indicated that those symptoms may have occurred two to four weeks after the injury. Id.
Finally, the medical panel notes that from Petitioner's description of the injury it is
apparent that there was no direct injury to the elbow, see id., but also clarifies this
statement by indicating that Petitioner suffered "sudden resisted flexion at the elbow."
Record at 312, 316.
The evidence relied upon by the medical panel was either not proper for them to
consider, was improperly interpreted or was insufficient in light of the other evidence.
First, it was clearly improper for the medical panel to even consider a WCF internal
medical records review that was not before it and was only vaguely referenced in the
ALJ's Interim Findings of Fact as the basis for appointing a medical panel. Second, the
medical panel misquotes and misinterprets June Neeley's report. CNP Neeley reported
that "[a]bout 3-4 weeks afterthe initial injury, Phoebe developed increased pain in her
left arm which seemed to shoot proximally and distally from the elbow region." Record
at 373 p. 15 {emphasis added.) This statement shows a somewhat shorter time frame for
the appearance of serious elbow pain than was stated by the medical panel, and, contrary
to the medical panel's interpretation, CNP Neeley's statement clearly implies that
Petitioner experienced left elbow pain shortly after the industrial accident, but that the
pain increased within 3-4 weeks. This interpretation is not inconsistent with a much later
statement by Petitioner that her left elbow pain significantly increased 2-4 weeks after the
accident.
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This leaves only the 2001 TOSH-PC records and the fact that Petitioner did not
suffer a direct blow to her left elbow in support of the medical panel's conclusion of lack
of medical causation. With regard to the 2001 TOSH-PC records, the medical panel first
seems to ignore the fact that these records reflect injury and pain relating to Petitioner's
shoulder, not Petitioner's elbow. The pain and other sensations that Petitioner suffered in
2001 clearly seem to originate in the shoulder area, not in the elbow as they have
following Petitioner's 2003 accident. Second, the medical panel seems to ignore the last
2001 TOSH-PC record, dated August 29, 2001, indicating that Petitioner had made
significant progress since starting therapy (a "5" on a scale of 1-5), that she was being
discharged because she had "met goals set at initial evaluation," and that her prognosis
was "good." Record at 106. When combined with CNP Neeley's later physical
examination notes that were cited by Dr. Hammond in his IME, Record at 84, 96
("extremities: [normal]; neuro: intact"), it is clear that whatever injury Petitioner suffered
to her shoulder in 2001 had fully healed and had no significant relationship to the injury
Petitioner suffered to her elbow in 2003.
Finally, the fact that Petitioner did not suffer a direct blow to her left elbow as part
of the industrial accident is very weak evidence to show a lack of medical causation.
Surprisingly, none of Petitioner's treating or examining physicians saw any lack of
medical causation. Clearly, CNP Neeley did not. Record at 373 p.27. Nor did Dr. Daniel
Sellers, who is an orthopedic surgeon and hand specialist. Record at 374 p.63, 345 - 347.
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Dr. Daniel Hammond, Respondents' own hand-picked independent medical examiner,
even went so far as to ascribe 95% of Petitioner's left ulnar injury to the February 19,
2003 industrial accident. Record at 302.
After reviewing the evidence relied upon by the medical panel, whose opinion was
adopted by the ALJ and the Labor Commission, it is clear that the finding of a lack of
medical causation was not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record. This lack of sufficient evidence to support this finding represents a denial
of due process to Petitioner and a violation of Section 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the Utah Code.
Without the medical panel's finding of lack of medical causation, the decision of the
Labor Commission almost certainly would have been more favorable to Petitioner.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Utah Labor Commission, from which this appeal is taken,
involved substantial breaches of Petitioner's right to due process, violated controlling
statutes and contravened controlling case law and applicable administrative rules.
The Labor Commission committed reversible error when it failed to provide all
relevant medical records, including but not limited to the report of the IME performed by
Dr. Hammond, to the medical panel that it had appointed to determine whether the
February 19, 2003 industrial accident caused the injuries for which Petitioner was being
treated. The Labor Commission also committed reversible error in connection with the
appointment and retention of the medical panel by (1) allowing an unsigned WCF internal
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physician's medical records review report to be used to create a medical controversy
requiring the appointment of a medical panel; (2) allowing the ALJ to delegate
appointment of members of the panel to the physician panel chair; (3) failing to provide
notice of the identities and affiliations of the proposed panel members, and an opportunity
to object, to Petitioner prior to appointing the members to the panel; and (4) failing to
remove Dr. Swensen from the medical panel and reversing and remanding the ALJ's
decision once Petitioner raised the issue of Dr. Swensen's potential partiality and bias.
Finally, the Labor Commission committed reversible error by adopting the finding of a
lack of medical causation by the medical panel when that finding was not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the record as a whole.
Because of these errors, Petitioner has been substantially prejudiced in that, but for
the medical panel's finding of a lack of medical causation, the Labor Commission's
decision almost certainly would have been much more favorable to Petitioner. For all of
the above reasons the Court should reverse the decision of the Labor Commission and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the requirements of due process
and applicable law.
DATED this j 5

day
dav of January, 2007.

mies A:McIntyre
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Attorneys for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (2004)
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2)(a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate
appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review
of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process,
or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
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decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Utah Code Ann. S34A-2-601 (2005)
(l)(a) The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical aspects of a case
described in this Subsection (l)(a) to a medical panel appointed by an administrative law
judge:
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the course of
employment for:
(A) disability by accident; or
(B) death by accident; and
(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance carrier denies liability.
(b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medical panel appointed by an
administrative law judge upon the filing of a claim for compensation based upon
disability or death due to an occupational disease.
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more
physicians specializing in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the
medical aspects of a controverted case, the division may employ a medical director or one
or more medical consultants:
(i) on a full-time or part-time basis; and
(ii) for the purpose of:
(A) evaluating the medical evidence; and
(B) advising an administrative law judge with respect to the administrative law
judge's ultimate fact-finding responsibility.
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical
consultants, the medical director or one or more medical consultants shall be allowed to
function in the same manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical
panel.
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(2)(a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant may do the
following to the extent the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant
determines that it is necessary or desirable:
(i) conduct a study;
(ii) take an x-ray;
(iii) perform a test; or
(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem
examination.
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make:
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed by the
Division of Adjudication; and
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require.
(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the requirements of Subsection
(2)(b), a medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall certify to the
administrative law judge:
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for
remuneration or profit;
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the medical
panel, medical director, or medical consultant results from the occupational disease; and
(iii)(A) whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in
any way contributed to the disability or death; and
(B) if another cause has contributed to the disability or death, the extent in
percentage to which the other cause has contributed to the disability or death.
(d)(i) The administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a report
submitted to the administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by certified mail with
return receipt requested to:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer; and
(C) the employer's insurance carrier.
(ii) Within 15 days after the report described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is deposited in
the United States post office, the following may file with the administrative law judge
written objections to the report:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer; or
(C) the employer's insurance carrier.
(iii) If no written objections are filed within the period described in Subsection
(2)(d)(ii), the report is considered admitted in evidence.
(e)(i) The administrative law judge may base the administrative law judge's finding
and decision on the report of:
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(A) a medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) one or more medical consultants.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), an administrative law judge is not bound
by a report described in Subsection (2)(e)(i) if other substantial conflicting evidence in
the case supports a contrary finding.
(f)(i) If an objection to a report is filed under Subsection (2)(d), the administrative
law judge may set the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved.
(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection (2)(f), any party may request the
administrative law judge to have any of the following present at the hearing for
examination and cross-examination:
(A) the chair of the medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) the one or more medical consultants.
(iii) For good cause shown, the administrative law judge may order the following
to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination:
(A) a member of a medical panel, with or without the chair of the medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) a medical consultant.
(g)(i) The written report of a medical panel, medical director, or one or more
medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing described in Subsection
(2)(f).
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(g)(i), a report received as an exhibit under
Subsection (2)(g)(i) may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as the
report is sustained by the testimony admitted.
(h) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultant before July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund established in Section 34A-2-702:
(i) expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, or
medical consultant; and
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's
appearance before the administrative law judge.
(i)(i) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out of
the Uninsured Employers' Fund established in Section 34A-2-704 the expenses of:
(A) the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical
consultant; and
(B) the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's appearance
before the administrative law judge.
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(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in Subsection
(2)(i)(i) shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers1 Fund whether or not the
employment relationship during which the industrial accident or occupational disease
occurred is localized in Utah as described in Subsection 34A-2-704(20).
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